St. John's Law Review
Volume 43
Number 2 Volume 43, October 1968, Number 2

Article 49

Motion to Reargue May Not Be Used to Extend Time to Appeal
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

1968]

THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

343

presently written. A transfer for the benefit of creditors was
held ineffective as to a previously executed restraining notice.
In deciding the case, the court made note of the intentional deletion
of the lien clause, but stated that to deny the superiority of the
judgment creditor who issued the notice would be to "make a
mockery of the provisions of CPLR 5222."202
The decision of the court is a great aid to plaintiffs in collecting judgments, and the practitioner should follow this case
closely in the appellate courts to see if this interpretation of
CPLR 5222 will receive further judicial sanction.
ARTICLE

55-

APPEALs GENERALLY

Motion to reargue may not be used to extend time to appeal.
In Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. v. Bero Construction
Corp., 203 plaintiff made a motion for reargument of its motion
to strike defenses after its time to appeal had expired. The appellate division, fourth department, relying on In re Huie,20 4 reversed special term's order which had granted plaintiff's motion.
The holding of Hvie, was reasserted. A motion to reargue cannot
must be
be used to extend the time to appeal; such
20 5 a motion
made before the time to appeal has elapsed.
Allowing a reargument is within the discretion of the
court,2°8 but it now appears, that the time limitation for appeal
is also the limitation period for a motion to reargue. An appeal
or motion to reargue will be granted after the time limit has
expired only under the special circumstances treated in CPLR
5015, e.g., the discovery of new evidence, fraud, or lack of jurisdiction.
The practitioner is thus advised, if the situation warrants,
first, and then if he desires, he may
to file his notice of appeal
2
move for reargument . 0

202 Id.at 605, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 684.
App. Div. 24 627, 286 N.Y.S.2d 287 (4th Dep't 1967).
20420 N.Y.2d 568, 232 N.E.2d 642, 285 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1967). See The
Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 43 ST. JOHN's L. R1v. 140, 165
20329

(1968).
2 05
See 2
(1965).
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200Ellis v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 198 Misc. 912, 102
N.Y.S.2d 337, 338 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1951).
207 See 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 2221, supp. commentary 18 (1967).

